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# THE SHIFTING ROLES OF WOMEN IN INTERGENERATIONAL MUTUAL CAREGIVING IN JAPAN: THE IMPORTANCE OF PEACE, POPULATION GROWTH, AND ECONOMIC EXPANSION

Kimiko Tanaka  
Nan E. Johnson

*This article looks at historical changes in the cultural superstructure defining the proper organization of elder care. Intergenerational mutual care in Japan developed in a context of various factors, including cultural ideals, centralization of the civil state, and the family unit, called the ie. In the Tokugawa period, care was often emphasized as men's morality in public, for the Tokugawa shogunate emphasized the Confucian ideology of filial piety. As Japan moved from the Tokugawa to the Meiji period, it became more feasible for the government to create legal pressures on women to care for children and the dependent elderly in the privatized ie. Although the ethics of care moved from the public to the private sphere, socioeconomic transformation enabled women to gain equal education and enabled the elderly to live longer. Generational differences now bring conflicts and tensions in Japanese society in determining where the morality of care should belong.*

**Keywords:** aging; family; history; Japan; elder care; gender

## INTRODUCTION

Various scholars have discussed aging in Japan as a result of demographic, cultural, and economic transformations after World War II that altered the balance of intergenerational caregiving.<sup>1</sup> The major problem in some of these literatures is the historical starting point scholars choose, because they usually assume that intergenerational caregiving changed only after that point. For instance, many scholars start with the patriarchal *ie* system (the system of primogeniture legally recognized in the Meiji Civil Code in 1898) as the benchmark against which to gauge the continuity, uniqueness, and change in elder care during the twentieth century.<sup>2</sup> These scholars assume that the cultural underpinnings of the *ie* (pronounced "ee-eh") define the care of "frail elderly" as "women's work," undertaken to preserve "women's morality."

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This assumption is misleading because the *ie* did not clearly assign elder care to the wife of the eldest son until the Meiji period (1868 AD–1912 AD).

The goal of this article is to show that the cultural superstructure defining the proper organization of elder care is not immutable. Rather, it has changed historically because of its interaction with period-specific demographic, economic, and political realities. This historical background is a key to understanding the social organization of elder care in contemporary Japanese society, the most long-lived society in the world. Toward this goal, we have organized this article into five historical periods according to the predominant mode of government: (1) the establishment of the Ritsuryō state (645 AD–900 AD), (2) the transition from the Ritsuryō state to the Tokugawa period, (3) the Tokugawa period (1603 AD–1868 AD), (4) the Meiji period until the Second World War (1868 AD–1939 AD), and (5) postwar Japan.

### THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RITSURYŌ STATE (645 AD–900 AD)

During the Yayoi era (200 BC–AD 300), the Japanese people experienced two innovations: bronze and iron articles introduced from mainland Asia, and settled agriculture, especially wet-rice cultivation. These improved people's lives compared to the preceding stone age, called the Jōmon era (10,000–200 BC). The Jōmon era is known for pottery that bears cord markings (Jōmon), which reflect cultural enrichment prior to this era. Prior to the Jōmon era, 10,000 to 7,000 years ago, people's lives were dependent on fishing and hunting. They lived in partly sunken, pole-and-thatch dwellings in scattered and small arboreal communities near the seashore.<sup>3</sup> They obtained fish by netting, diving, digging, and line fishing, and they supplemented this fare with game and forest fruit, which continued until around the third century BC.<sup>4</sup> During the Jōmon era, the single-room house was enlarged and its framing was reorganized so that they no longer needed a center pole to support the roof, and bare earth was replaced by drier stone flooring.<sup>5</sup>

Beginning about the third century BC, by replacing and supplementing the hunting, fishing, and gathering habits of previous generations, settled cultivation contributed to the population growth in the Yayoi period.<sup>6</sup> Increased food supply through farming enabled people to live in much larger villages, some estimated to include 500–600 houses, which gradually required and enabled trading activities, a hierarchical community, and political consolidation.<sup>7</sup> Consequently, social inequalities widened as the nation moved from a system based on unstable slash-and-burn agriculture to more productive settled agriculture accompanied by population growth. A more reliable food supply probably spurred

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population increase by depressing the mortality rate. Before the Yayoi era, the population was estimated to be between 120,000 and 350,000 people. By the end of the Yayoi period, iron farming tools and more sophisticated irrigation techniques had contributed to further population growth, increasing the population to between 1.5 million and 4.5 million.<sup>8</sup> Despite archaeological evidence including burial practices, the lack of reliable data makes the trends from 300 AD to 645 AD rough estimates.<sup>9</sup>

According to a Chinese report of circa AD 297, Chinese visitors observed the Japanese people (“the people of Wa”) living in houses where father and mother, and elder and younger, slept separately. They also reported “that men of importance” enjoyed four or five wives and the deference of their inferiors. They also described, however, that there was no distinction between father and son, or men and women, in their meetings and their deportment.<sup>10</sup> Even with very limited resources, it is possible to infer that the system of primogeniture was not established before the Ritsuryō state.

In the mid-seventh century, emerging powers in East Asia, especially China’s Tang Empire, became a growing threat to Japanese rulers. In response, Japanese political leaders established the Ritsuryō state (645 AD–900 AD)—a Chinese-style centralized civil state based on legal codes. The emperor Tenji proclaimed that the state bureaucracy was to be a rationalized and systematic organization, and announced a plan to use Chinese systems of taxation, local government, and land tenure in the Taika Reform Edict in 646 AD. Under Tenji’s hegemony, the Japanese people were enrolled in a civil register, and surnames were established for the purposes of taxation and conscription. The first census followed in 670 AD.<sup>11</sup> Errors of coverage and accuracy, however, make these registers unreliable as a source of population analysis. Despite these difficulties and limitations, Ferris applied stable population analysis and estimated that the life expectancy at birth ranged from twenty-eight to thirty-three years.<sup>12</sup> The infant mortality rate was so high that, although peasants were given grants of rice paddies at birth in 690 AD, children aged five or younger in calendar years soon became the exception.<sup>13</sup>

The Ritsuryō state brought the ancient Chou principle of inheritance by the eldest son of the sole legal wife, at least among the leading nobility.<sup>14</sup> Because the Ritsuryō state also brought social stratification based on class, age, and gender, this resulted in official resources containing very little evidence about women, although they played a surprisingly powerful role as *toji*. To promote Chinese concepts of patrilineality and male dominance, official documents recorded conventional gender-biased images of the productive activities of men.<sup>15</sup> According to hidden sources such as old tales (*setsuwa*) relating the lives of common people and to archaeological findings such as wooden tablets (*mokkan*) used for keeping routine records when paper was an expensive commodity, *toji* played a major role in rural society, managing agricultural enterprises and supervising labor.<sup>16</sup> Thus, although *toji* became the term “housewife” (*shufu*) in later history,<sup>17</sup> *toji* should not be regarded as “wives” who exercised leadership as proxies for their husbands in the local community.<sup>18</sup> On a

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*Autonomize Daughters-in-Law Who Live with Their Mothers-in-Law in India? A Test of Caldwell’s Thesis,* Women in International Development Working Papers Series, no. 285 (East Lansing, Mich.: Women in International Development, 2006), <http://www.wid.msu.edu/resources/papers/pdf/WP285.pdf>; and Kimiko Tanaka and Nan E. Johnson, “What Japan Can Do to Push Its Longevity Envelope” (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 2006), <http://www.prb.org/Articles/2006/WhatJapanCanDoToPushItsLongevityEnvelope.aspx>.

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higher level, *ōtoji*, grand *toji*, managed productive enterprises within their independent residences. In addition, from studying lineage records and inheritance patterns, historians have concluded that Japan was not organized along patrilineal lines; rather, it was a bilateral society in which lineages of both father and mother were important.<sup>19</sup> Hence, there were many gaps between the idealized patriarchal Ritsuryō state and actual social conditions. Efforts at both central and local levels to cope with these gaps gradually transformed the nation to the Ritsuryō system, which better fit the social and economic actuality of the time.<sup>20</sup>

Along with a Chinese-style centralized state, the Ritsuryō system also brought the Confucian spirit of filial piety to Japan.<sup>21</sup> For instance, the Ritsuryō system required men to pay a tax depending on their age. Men aged sixty-one to sixty-five years paid only half of the tax paid by men between twenty-two and sixty years old, and men ages sixty-six or older paid no tax.<sup>22</sup> Because of the low survival rates of infants and the elderly, their existence was often described as spiritual, which is reflected in the saying “Oite futatabi chigo ni naru” [“People become a child again when they become the old”].<sup>23</sup>

In such a context, senile dementia was considered an existence that moved a person close to God, and people warmly watched over them. From pictures on scrolls that depict children holding the hand of the elderly and the elderly walking while holding children’s shoulders,<sup>24</sup> it appears that children, rather than daughters-in-law, took care of the elderly. Although Confucianism taught children to respect the elderly, the cultural ideal of a woman, a daughter-in-law, taking care of the elderly was not established. Many picture scrolls (*emaki*) and *setsuwa* also described the elderly farming and taking care of the grandchildren.<sup>25</sup> The elderly also were described as great contributors to the society by virtue of their wisdom and experience. Along with women and children, however, the elderly were also described as socially weak and to be socially marginal. This was reflected in old tales in which the young left the elderly in the mountains (*ubasute-yama*). These tales appear, however, to exist for people to criticize such impious children; hence, it appears that children took caregiving roles of the elderly.<sup>26</sup> Due to high infant and child mortality, there were also old tales that described the elderly worrying and grieving about their care in later life.<sup>27</sup> In other words, women’s morality to be responsible for elder care was not prevalent, not even universalized. It appears that morality was contextual rather than universal. Rather than being regulated by a centralized government with formal and abstract rules and orders, moral life was preserved in a community, especially among peasants.

### MOVING FROM THE RITSURYŌ STATE TO THE TOKUGAWA PERIOD (1603 AD–1868 AD): BIRTH OF THE *IE*

During the Classical period (710 AD–1185 AD), at least among the elite, the estate was equally divided among all the children, including daughters.<sup>28</sup> From the tenth century to the eleventh century, gradually from upper noble classes, the concept of *ie* emerged; and by the beginning of the Tokugawa period, the concept had developed to be systematized as the *ie* system, a way to bequeath government posts from fathers to sons through primogeniture. *Ie* is a term that is widely defined as the Japanese “stem family” in current literatures;<sup>29</sup> however, as various anthropologists argued, originally the term *ie* connoted a “household” based on coresidence that could include members unrelated by blood, marriage, or adoption. In other words,

*ie* was a term used to describe traditional Japanese “households” based on participation in the *ie* economy and coresidence, rather than on kinship ties or the Confucian dyad of father and son.

Conceptually, the *ie* included not only its members but also the *ie* economy (e.g., crafts production, farming, and retail sales) and resources (e.g., tools and land).<sup>30</sup> The *ie* was the basic economic unit in society. Rather than biological continuity, the heart of the *ie* was to continue the *ie* throughout generations.<sup>31</sup> The core structure of the *ie* was not the household head and his spouse, and it was not narrowly defined as the idealized Confucian dyad of father and son. To continue the *ie* economy, adopted men of proved competence could inherit the *ie*, occasionally at the expense of direct biological heirs.<sup>32</sup> Thus, the *ie* could stand in contrast to the kinship-based term *kazoku*, a term invented in the nineteenth century to deal with the Western idea of the nuclear family in Japan.<sup>33</sup> The *ie* is also different from the Chinese *jia*, which is purely patrilineal. Therefore, Japan did not simply import a Chinese-style centralized state during the Ritsuryō period.

As the militarization of Japanese society flourished under the samurai class during the Medieval period (1185 AD–1600 AD), the social position of women declined. Many women lost their right to inherit property and exercise public authority. The political leadership fostered equal inheritance among sons during the Kamakura period (1185 AD–1336 AD) to prevent families from building an economic power base.<sup>34</sup> Although some variations (inheritance by the firstborn female or lastborn child) were seen across regions during the Muromachi period (1336 AD–1573 AD), inheritance through primogeniture gradually replaced equal inheritance among sons.<sup>35</sup> Bequeathing the authority and resources to the eldest son increased the chance that the *ie* estate could be passed down and maintained throughout generations.

Such an *ie* system was not prevalent except among noble families and samurai families until the middle of the nineteenth century (the Tokugawa period).<sup>36</sup> In fact, marriage was an official ceremony only for the privileged classes.<sup>37</sup> Around the tenth century, men could have multiple wives and mistresses; but noblemen were restricted to one lawful wife (*seisai*) during the eleventh century.<sup>38</sup> Wives of the upper classes took care of the household not only by preparing meals but also by providing maintenance of weapons; managing the food supply for the *ie*; managing apprentices, followers, and their families who supported the *ie*; and managing the *ie* economy, as well as the marriage to sustain and nurture the *ie*. After the death of their husband, these wives became *goke*, who often had the final say about the management of the *ie*.<sup>39</sup> The division of labor was not strictly and clearly gendered. Both husbands and wives supported each other to nurture the *ie* by increasing their land and resources through wars and political contributions, by increasing their followers through taking care of their families to gain their trust, and by expanding their land and resources through a marriage of convenience.<sup>40</sup> The important status of wives as decision makers of the household economy was also the same for other, lower classes.<sup>41</sup>

Prior to the Tokugawa period, most of the population was rural, and the economy was based on subsistence agriculture due to the lack of an urban population.<sup>42</sup> Due to high mortality and unstable socioeconomic conditions caused by wars and famine, few elderly could be taken care of by their relatives. Even when elders in the lower classes could survive, it appears that many of them lacked immediate kin and lived on a lord’s manor in a community as servants.<sup>43</sup> One of the Buddhist tales (*bukkyo setsuwa*), *Shasekishū*, talked about a priest who suffered from paralysis mourning

his situation that he did not have any wives or children to take care of him. Hence, it appears that ideal caregivers were relatives, not strictly women.<sup>44</sup> The elderly in noble families and samurai families could enjoy their authority as the succession of the *ie* became important. Some upper-class elderly, however, decided not to be dependent on the *ie* and spent their later life in temples as Buddhist priests or nuns.<sup>45</sup> Hence, although the elderly were scarce in the past but are abundant in the present, there was diversity in family and aging before the Tokugawa period. Although most did not survive to old age, some worried about their care in later life, some tactically used their power to sustain autonomy in later life, some detached from the *ie* by becoming priests and nuns, some wished to be dependent on their children, and others contributed to society as laborers or caregivers of grandchildren.

### THE TOKUGAWA PERIOD (1603 AD–1868 AD): TRANSITION TO MODERNIZATION

During the Tokugawa (Edo) period, the Tokugawa shogunate ordered the populace to register at a Buddhist temple and practice ancestor worship.<sup>46</sup> The main purpose of this order was to suppress Christianity,<sup>47</sup> which places one's relationship to God before all others; hence, it posed a threat to the subjects' loyalty to the feudal lords and the shogunate.<sup>48</sup>

Temples began to function as centers of religious and household registration (*shumon aratame-chō*).<sup>49</sup> The government used the feudal structure of the *ie* as a fundamental social group to regulate and govern people's behaviors and ideas. Nakane claimed that<sup>50</sup> the effectiveness of regulations reaching every village and household even up in the remote hill areas was not simply a reflection of the power of the Tokugawa shogunate, but also a by-product of the layers of loyalty and the lord-vassal relationship (*oyabun* and *kobun*). Nakane analyzed that<sup>51</sup> China had a strong horizontal social organization, and their central administration constructed on horizontal bases, such as the network of patrilineal clan organizations, guilds, and castes, had difficulty in extending the basis of its authority throughout the entire population. Hence, Japanese vertical social organizational pattern—Japanese cultural emphasis on putting the collective over the individual to preserve harmonious integration (*wa*) in families and communities—was natively rooted before the advent of Chinese influence.

Demographically, the Tokugawa period was innovative compared with the preceding period. The religious investigation registers or the village population registers (*shumon aratame-chō*) were census-type listings of village populations compiled every year, with information added in many cases about births, deaths, and marriages that occurred during the year.<sup>52</sup> Significant improvement in historical demography to use such registers contributed to current scholars revising previous studies of the relationship between demography and economy in the Tokugawa period.

About 1730, Japan ranked in size with France, holding a population of between 20 and 30 million. A century and a half later, it fell to a lower ranking with Italy, considerably smaller than France and Germany. It took Japan close to 200 years to double its population level to reach 60 million.<sup>53</sup> Hence, the first generation of population historians up to the early 1960s pointed to a stagnating population trend during the Tokugawa period due to poor economic conditions of both samurai and peasant classes.<sup>54</sup>

The literature published in the past fifty years in the field of Tokugawa historical demography analyzed that population stagnation during the Tokugawa period could

be explained by the Malthusian notions of “preventive checks” such as abortion and infanticide (*mabiki*) and “positive checks” such as famine and epidemics.<sup>55</sup> These literatures analyzed that fertility was high due to high infant and maternal mortality, and lack of effective contraceptive knowledge and skills. These factors led the Japanese to practice abortion and infanticide when too many children were conceived or born.<sup>56</sup> Similarly, these literatures argue that population stagnation is consistent with the Marxist notion of exploitation: both positive and preventive checks to ameliorate starvation operated directly to kill peasants who were exploited by samurai lords.<sup>57</sup>

In the past twenty years, new evidence based on the religious investigation registers or the village population registers have refuted such Malthusian and Marxist assumptions of population stagnation during the Tokugawa period, and these suggest that the majority of peasants enjoyed rising productivity and a higher standard of living.<sup>58</sup> Scholars argued that<sup>59</sup> establishment of the Tokugawa shogunate led to a flourishing of castle towns and post towns, and rural residents were forced to increase the efficiency of agricultural production to catch up with growing urban demand. In addition, the spread of commercial and handicraft industries enabled an increasing number of people to make a living outside of farming because they could leave for commercial centers.<sup>60</sup> According to Hanley,<sup>61</sup> economic development in the Tokugawa period can be likened to that in England in the century prior to the Industrial Revolution. The English limited family size because they understood that too many children could threaten their ability to accumulate resources. For instance, the village of Fujito experienced economic development but limited families by postponing the age at marriage for women to their mid-thirties, and sending younger sons out to work in another village or to be adopted in by another household.<sup>62</sup> Hence, the new evidence suggests that, prior to industrialization, although famine and disease contributed to slow population growth (and there were regional differences), Japan experienced increasing urbanization, a growth in the commercial sector, rising incomes, and gradual commercialization of agriculture, all good indicators of a growing economy.<sup>63</sup>

Looking at fertility in detail, the well-documented village of Yokouchi reported in the religious investigation registers or the village population registers that for women born before 1700, the *total fertility rate* (TFR), defined as the average number of children a woman would have, assuming that current age-specific birth rates remained constant,<sup>64</sup> was 5.8 children per woman. For the 1701-1750, 1751-1800, and post-1800 periods, TFR decreased to 4.0, then to 3.2 and 3.4 respectively. The TFR was low due to unregistered infant deaths. Infant deaths before the next census-taking date were likely to be underrecorded. Taking this deficiency into account, the decrease in TFR was from about 7 to 4-5.<sup>65</sup>


This reduction of TFR was also accompanied by the rise in life expectancy. For the village of Yokouchi, the life expectancy at two years increased from thirty-three to forty-three years.<sup>66</sup> Saito pointed out that<sup>67</sup> Wolf and Hanley estimated Tokugawa women married relatively late, at a little older than age twenty-three on the average, and he claimed that this number should be cautiously interpreted because there were substantial regional differences, and also people tended to overstate mean age at marriage because of delays in village population registration.<sup>68</sup> Hence, the actual mean age at marriage for women could be considerably younger than twenty-three in various regions. For men, although there were regional variations, the mean age at marriage was in the latter half of their twenties.<sup>69</sup>

Patterns of marriage and fertility were geographically diverse in the Tokugawa period. Hayami and Kurosu<sup>70</sup> divided Japan (excluding Hokkaido and Okinawa) into three regions (Figure 1)—the northeast, central, and southwest—where necessary historical sources were available, and analyzed regional diversity in demographic and family patterns based on the data that are samples from within the larger region. According to Hayami and Kurosu,<sup>71</sup> the northeastern region was characterized by an extremely low median age at marriage (nineteen years old for men and thirteen years old for women). For women, this age reached 17.1 years by the end of the period. In this region, women also stopped having children early (about thirty-three years), and the number of births per couple was quite low despite early marriages (three to four children per couple).<sup>72</sup> Another characteristic of this region was that people in this northeastern region temporarily migrated to other regions in Japan, often cities, to supplement their income during the winter (*dekasegi*). Although Japan was closed to international immigration and emigration for more than 200 years (*sakoku*; 1641 AD–1853 AD), there were both temporary and permanent internal migrations for purposes of employment (*dekasegi*).<sup>73</sup> Because people migrated to other places for income on a temporary basis, marriage was a way to keep both men and women bound to villages and households.<sup>74</sup> The word *dekasegi* implies that they would come home after a while, reflecting parental power over their children.<sup>75</sup> These temporary internal migrations in this region lessened the risk of pregnancy and lengthened the birth interval, which in turn reduced the overall number of births.<sup>76</sup> In this region, Saito found that<sup>77</sup> peasant women also had to limit births by practicing infanticide due to poor economic conditions, but this was not because they had too many children.

In the central provinces (Figure 1), where relatively large preindustrial cities were located, average age at the first marriage was higher than in the northeastern provinces (about twenty-eight years for men, and 20.5 for women, in the late eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century). The number of children per couple was also higher than in the northeastern provinces (5.9 to 6.5 children per couple). Although some people in this region were work migrants, they migrated on a permanent basis, rather than on a temporary basis.<sup>78</sup> Lower-class people were more likely to migrate to other places of Japan to supplement their income (*dekasegi*), and in contrast to the northeastern region, the majority of them migrated to other places of Japan, often cities, to supplement their income prior to marriage. Therefore, many families in the lower stratum risked the termination of the lineage (*zekke*), but families in the upper stratum married early and tended to have more children to maintain the family line.<sup>79</sup>

Unlike the central regions, the southwestern regions (Figure 1) had no large cities; but the age at marriage was high, just as in the central regions. Marital fertility rate and the number of premarital births were high; and divorce, remarriage, and premarital childbearing were common in this region.<sup>80</sup> The higher standards of living enabled peasants in southwestern Japan to limit their family size not because of poverty, but as a means of adjusting the size of the family labor force to changing economic environments.<sup>81</sup> Hence, there was regional and class diversity in marriage and fertility in the Tokugawa period.

Historical demographers and economists have argued that poor economic conditions caused many villages to limit their family sizes and, thus, for population size to stagnate during the Tokugawa period.<sup>82</sup> But other scholars have claimed that peasants limited their family size, even resorting to infanticide, to maintain a favorable



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Figure 1. Map of Japan

man-to-land ratio and to attain a higher standard of living.<sup>83</sup> Taking a different perspective, Cornell argued that<sup>84</sup> rather than using deliberate controls on fertility, people controlled their family size by natural methods, such as through long-term breast-feeding practices and spousal separation through migration to emerging and developing cities. The fertility decline in the Tokugawa period refutes the underlying assumption of the demographic transition theory that people were ignorant about fertility control in preindustrial societies. Historical demography is still in its development in Japan, and more research is necessary to interpret patterns of marriage and fertility for both men and women during the Tokugawa period.

Mortality was high during the Tokugawa period. The life expectancy at birth was estimated to be in the lower thirties from 1776 to 1875.<sup>85</sup> Bad weather, poor harvests, high prices, and possible famine were prevalent in modern agriculture when vaccination and medical treatment were not available. There were major food crises in the 1730s, 1780s, and 1830s. The Japanese population was large enough to have epidemic and infectious diseases as well. Epidemics such as smallpox, measles,




Figure 2. Population of Japan

Source: Hiroshi Kito, *Jinko Kara Yomu Nihon No Rekishi* (Demographic analysis of Japanese history), 7th ed. (Tokyo: Kodan-sha, 2001).

influenza, and diarrheal diseases also raised death rates.<sup>86</sup> In addition, infant mortality rates were very high, implying one death out of every three to four children before they reached their first birthday.<sup>87</sup> Hence, before industrialization, population growth was gradual in premodern Japan (Figure 2). Famine and disease greatly contributed to this slow population growth, as did social control—deliberate behavior to limit population growth, or consequences of relatively long-term breastfeeding practice and migrant workers (*dekasegi*).<sup>88</sup>

The household, not the individual, was perceived as the basic social unit and legal unit of the society.<sup>89</sup> The title to rights (*kabu*) in the village community was attached not to the head of the *ie* as an individual, but to the *ie*. This was because during the Tokugawa period, the peasant household was an economic entity—the unit of economic production and consumption—and the family members included kin as well as tenants and servants.<sup>90</sup> From the paddy field, to the forest, and to dry land, these rights were attached to the *ie* rather than to any individual family member.<sup>91</sup> The increase of surplus productions owing to a significant increase in agricultural productions during the Tokugawa period, however, gradually enabled more people (e.g., more employees and their families, and more relatives) to establish their own *ie*.<sup>92</sup> Consequently, the *ie* began to shift its meaning from a social group based on cooperation in the *ie* economy to a group based on kinship ties or the Confucian dyad of father and son.<sup>93</sup>

Kumagai explained that<sup>94</sup> among the lower strata, including peasants, artisans, merchants, and *eta* (“pariahs of society”), systematized succession of the *ie* did not exist. Although all the people except *eta* had names given to show their occupations, they were not family names. The headship of the household was not restricted to the

eldest son: each household selected a son of superior character to guarantee the succession of the household.<sup>95</sup> Among the upper strata, aristocrats, the shogunate, samurai warriors, and the increasing numbers of independent farmers, the *ie*, gradually formed from the late tenth century to the eleventh century, matured in the Tokugawa period into the feudal family structure of the *ie* system. As the succession of the *ie* became more important, systematizing the *ie* succession became a promising way to pass on the *ie* from one generation to another.

Under the *ie* system, one son, preferably the eldest son, remained in the parents' household, whereas others had to leave. Family members were divided into those on the stem family line (*chokkei*) and out of the line (*bokei*), and son-heirs enjoyed a higher social status than other siblings.<sup>96</sup> Because the marriage of the eldest son became the most important and urgent matter for the succession of the *ie*, those who stayed in the *ie* tended to marry earlier than those who left. Whether the other brothers stayed in the household also depended on how large and extensive the *ie* estate was. To sustain the material well-being of the collectivity and to adjust the size and structure of the *ie* to meet the demands of family farming, parents sent children to work for someone else such as merchants, kept in or removed other siblings from the household, took in an employed farm laborer, or deliberately or unintentionally limited family size.<sup>97</sup> As was common in preindustrial Europe, one of the sons would marry and take over the farm. In preindustrial Europe, however, this process took place at the retirement of the father.<sup>98</sup> In Japan, the old household head did not need to retire when his heir married.<sup>99</sup> Some elderly in the upper strata held power and autonomy until or even after they retired from work to help the *ie* succeed and to manage its members.

Although primogeniture was prevalent among the upper strata, the succession of the *ie* itself was not an easy task. Children, especially boys, had a vested interest in the continuation of the *ie* throughout time. Because of the lack of vaccination and medical treatment in those times, however, infectious diseases often killed the eldest son. Hence, demographically, it was necessary, especially among people in lower strata, to keep the *ie* as a household based on economic cooperation and coresidence, and not to restrict the position of heir to the eldest son. Because of the lack of vaccination and medical treatment in those times, elderly parents were less likely to rely on their children for a long time. According to Kito (2000),<sup>100</sup> children needed to take care of their parents for only about three years after their retirement.

After the beginning of the eighteenth century, writings about the morality of care, concrete ways of caring for the elderly, and health began to increase. Hence, the importance of care prevalent among the upper strata of society began to be socially recognized.<sup>101</sup> Ideologically, the Tokugawa shogunate emphasized the Confucian ideology of filial piety. Several writings of Ekiken Kaibara, a Confucian, emphasized the moral importance of children, especially the man as the head of the *ie*, to care for the elderly. There are various kinds of such writings for men, and some of them include concrete ways to take care of the elderly. There are also moral writings for women, but they did not include such practical information about care.<sup>102</sup> Some people in the upper social strata also hired servants to care for the elderly, but these servants were not restricted to women. Some wealthy families hired male servants to care for the elderly in the case of emergencies, including a fire.<sup>103</sup>

In addition, the Tokugawa shogunate also made an effort to strengthen and spread this ideology to the people in the lower strata by providing such writings about filial piety

targeted at the populace. Owing to an emphasis on literacy for commoners as well as the samurai, and the development of popular folk schools (*tera koya*), it is estimated that close to 40 percent of the Japanese were literate before 1868, a very high figure by the world standard.<sup>104</sup> Among these writings, more works again emphasized and valued the moral necessity of men, rather than women, to take care of the elderly through coresidence.<sup>105</sup> According to *Kōgiroku*, the popular moral writing describing the importance of filial care of the elderly, the father as head of the household sits at the head of the table, often being replaced after his death by his wife, not his son, even among families in the lower strata.<sup>106</sup> This practice reflects the spirit of the Edo period based on Confucianism.

The heavy duties of elder care, even when elders did not live as long as they do today, are suggested by stories in *Kōgiroku*. A man remained celibate to take care of his parents. A woman's parents, worried about her heavy duty of care, suggested to her that she divorce, but she refused. A man who took care of his mother divorced his wife because she was not obedient to his parents.<sup>107</sup> Hence, *Kōgiroku* not only highly valued women who were obedient and cared for their husbands and his parents, but also highly praised men who financially, emotionally, and physically took care of their parents.

Recently, Kyoto Prefectural Library and Archives reported that<sup>108</sup> the village of Kameoka allowed elder care leave for samurai. There was a letter written by a firefighter in Kyoto in 1819, asking to take elder care leave to take care of his grandmother. Hence, in the Tokugawa period, caregiving was not restricted to women. There was no cultural or universal ideal that daughters-in-law should be the main caregiver for the elderly. Rather, care was often emphasized as part of men's morality, as a responsibility assumed by a head of household. As Kasugai pointed out,<sup>109</sup> care was also valued by the public, because it represented the Confucian precept of filial piety and the spirit of the Tokugawa shogunate. It was only after the unification of the Meiji period that the morality of care shifted from men to women, and from public to private.

Emerging from 150 years of civil war, the Tokugawa period brought 150 years of peace, which transformed the samurai class during the Tokugawa period. At the beginning of the Tokugawa period, the samurai class was the real warrior class. Without actual battles and separation from the land, however, the samurai class was gradually transformed to a bureaucratic elite class of civil administrators living in urban areas. Transformation of samurai into civilian administrators increased the numbers of schools and literacy. Without actual battles, the number of the samurai class also increased to 2 million people by the time of the Meiji restoration; the number was larger than that of the English or European aristocracy.<sup>110</sup> Consequently, more ranks were created within the class and resulted in bureaucratization of the samurai class. Bureaucratization also gradually transformed the nature of loyalty and the lord-vassal relationship (*oyabun* and *kobun*) to impersonal loyalty to the office. Accompanied by increasing costs of living, maintaining the samurai in various rankings resulted in samurai impoverishment. Hence, not from below but from within the ruling class, lower-class samurai who were dissatisfied with the Tokugawa system led the struggle for the Meiji restoration.<sup>111</sup> Farmers suffered from an increasing burden of land tax as well. From 1824 to 1836, frequent bad weather led to famine, and the dissatisfaction of starving peasants increased toward the rich who taxed and relied on food they cultivated.<sup>112</sup> Finally, the Tokugawa shogunate fell, and the Meiji Period began in 1868.

## THE MEIJI PERIOD TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1868 AD–1939 AD): MODERNIZATION OF THE STATE AND THE *IE* SYSTEM

The new Meiji government achieved a centralization of political authority unparalleled in history, and it pushed industrialization and economic growth to catch up with and to build national strength to ward off American and European imperialism.<sup>113</sup> Meiji leaders encouraged the adoption of Western social customs and cultural styles to reach the goal of “enlightenment and civilization” (*bunmei kaika*).<sup>114</sup> To become a modern state, Japan also opened its markets to foreign trade and began to industrialize. These changes aided economic and agricultural development. Cholera, however, frequently attacked the Japanese people and killed thousands in 1886. One record indicated that the Japanese government purchased rats from people to reduce cholera because they realized that a flea parasite on the rats brought the cholera bacterium to Japan.<sup>115</sup>

Due to crowded working conditions, diseases, such as tuberculosis, increased with industrialization. In addition, endemic and infectious diseases were more common than chronic degenerative diseases. In 1920, the leading causes of death were pneumonia, bronchitis, gastroenteritis, and tuberculosis. Chronic degenerative diseases such as heart disease, cancer, and stroke did not replace them until 1958. Owing to gradually improving living standards, medical technology, and sanitary conditions, however, the Japanese population gradually transformed from the stage of high mortality and high fertility to the stage of low mortality and lowered fertility during the Meiji era.<sup>116</sup> The mortality rate fell faster than the fertility rate, and so population growth accelerated and provided an expanding labor force.<sup>117</sup> This course of industrialization was also a course for militarization and nationalization in Japan. The concept of the *ie* became an unparalleled means for the government to unify and strengthen its population.

Before 1898, there was no legal system governing people’s behaviors except for the upper classes, including aristocrats and samurai.<sup>118</sup> The *ie* was legally recognized in the Meiji Civil Code in 1898 and officially called the *ie* system (*ie seido*). The *ie* system came to characterize both lower-class as well as upper-class families in Japan.<sup>119</sup> The purpose of the Meiji Civil Code was to recognize the family system, the pattern of primogeniture, as the basis for the Meiji government to rule over people. Based on the Confucian teachings of filial piety, the *ie* system formed the ideological ground for the Meiji government that put the emperor as its head of the state and the state as a single family.<sup>120</sup> Along with the Confucian ethos of the father and son relationship being preeminent over the husband and wife relationship and the father and daughter relationship,<sup>121</sup> the relationships between parents and children and between husband and wife were like the relationship between superior and subordinate, suppressing individuality to preserve the harmony of the family.<sup>122</sup>

The *ie* system effectively functioned for the government to unify and control the thoughts of an ever-increasing Japanese population. To catch up with foreign nations and to become a modern nation, the government socially constructed motherhood (*bosei*) as woman’s morality. Prior to the Meiji period, there were no widespread cultural expectations for women to show maternal affection in raising children. For instance, although women in an upper-class family were considered tools to produce a male successor, their infants were often given to a nurse to raise.<sup>123</sup> Under the slogans “Fukoku Kyohei” [enrich the country and strengthen the military] and “Umeyo,




Figure 3. Total Fertility Rate (TFR), 1925 to 2004

Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (Tokyo, 2006).

fuyaseyo” [give birth and increase the population], abortion was largely prohibited so as to increase the quantity of children. To improve quality, however, abortion became legal under the National Eugenics Law in 1940 to save the life of the mother and for a woman suspected to be carrying a genetically defective child.<sup>124</sup> To compete with foreign nations as a modern state, the government privatized the role of women by suppressing and educating them to be nurturing, wise mothers, and tactically used the *ie* system to become one collective under the emperor. Women became socialized to be nurturing mothers who contributed to increasing the quantity and improving the quality of the population.<sup>125</sup> As a result, Japan kept its TFR higher than 3.0 until the end of the baby boom period in the late 1940s (Figure 3), which contributed to its population growth (Figure 2).

As the population rapidly grew and industrialization proceeded, the government required more men and money to support nationalism and industrialization. The government tactically used the *ie* system to supply these resources by privatizing the *ie* and reconstructing the morality of care. In 1872, the Meiji government replaced the religious investigation registers or the village population registers (*shumon aratamechō*) with the family register system (*koseki*). In the former system, all the members of a village were registered by household, whereas in the latter system, the vital events were recorded on the basis of the stem family.<sup>126</sup> In other words, the *ie* became increasingly recognized more as a “family” based on blood ties and marriage rather than as a “household” based on economic participation. The *ie* system provided the eldest son a legal right to inherit family property, thereby placing considerable moral obligation on the eldest son and his wife to take care of his elderly parents. Tied to the Confucian precepts that stressed the responsibility of a wife to be obedient and take care of her family,<sup>127</sup> the wife of the eldest son became the primary caregiver for any frail, dependent, or sick family members by becoming unpaid housekeepers, nurses, and companions.<sup>128</sup> Women’s morality was tactically emphasized to supply an obedient population for the emperor under the myth of motherhood<sup>129</sup> and to

repay limitless obligations (*on*) to the revered elderly under the tradition of Confucian precepts. The ethics of care became increasingly recognized as women's morality in the private sphere, rather than men's morality in the public sphere.<sup>130</sup> Consequently, the life course became gendered, and aging and the family became universally idealized. The dependent elderly were now expected to place themselves in the care of their eldest son's family and under the hands-on assistance of his wife (the daughter-in-law).

The idealization and privatization of the *ie* enabled men to work in industries, such as machinery and metal manufacturing, to support booming capitalism and nationalism. According to the 1909 central government survey of factories employing five or more operatives, 2 percent of women worked in machinery and metal-manufacturing industries. Importantly, however, capitalism and nationalism in Japan were also achieved through hidden women's work. In fact, no less than 85.2 percent of them, mostly young unmarried women, worked in the textile industry, which was a leading sector in the early development of industrialization (1880 AD–1940 AD) in Japan.<sup>131</sup> In addition, along with booming industrialization, a great number of families engaged in trade or professional services came to hire female domestic servants. In 1930, there were 710,000 maids in Japan, calculated as one in every seventeen households.<sup>132</sup> These female domestic servants and female textile workers were mainly younger girls, the majority of whom were rural in origin.<sup>133</sup> Hence, the modernization, industrialization, and nationalism of Japan were supported by what Coontz called "women's altruism."<sup>134</sup>

From the Tokugawa period to the beginning of the Meiji period, from the upper strata to the lower strata, more elderly became "priceless" in that their status became sentimentalized with respect in the public community. A couple of decades after the Meiji period started, textbooks described the elderly as socially weak and dependent on care, while valuing those elderly who were active and independent.<sup>135</sup> On the surface, based on the Confucian precepts of filial piety, the elderly were highly respected because they were resourceful; but in reality, they were often identified as those who were unable to adapt to the modernization process.<sup>136</sup> In contrast with the Tokugawa shogunate that was based on the Confucian spirit of filial piety, the Meiji period represents the time the government was eager to modernize and nationalize Japan. As the nation became capitalized, supporting one's wife and children was considered more profitable than supporting the elderly. Hence, although demographically more elderly became culturally revered from the Tokugawa to the Meiji period, their cultural status suffered with the privatization of the moral responsibility for their care. It could be possible to state that the peak of the social value of the dependent elderly was in the Tokugawa period, when the ethics of care was publicly valued and recognized.

### POSTWAR JAPAN: THE PATH TO BECOMING THE MOST LONG-LIVED NATION IN THE WORLD

The *ie* system was legally abolished after Japan lost the Second World War. The United States took over the nation to democratize and Westernize it in a short period. As a result, Japan has gone through dramatic social and demographic change since the Second World War. For example, Japan experienced a steep fertility decline after the baby boom faded out in the early 1950s (Figure 3). In 1947, it was high (TFR = 4.54); however, ten years later, it was 2.11, the replacement level. This steep fertility decline

was related to the legal abolition of the gender-biased *ie* system and its replacement by a new family system based on equality. It led Japanese women to legally claim equal rights in inheritance, education, and employment. More and more Japanese women gained greater opportunity to attain autonomy and freedom.<sup>137</sup> Enrollment of women in senior high school increased significantly in the 1960s. By 1975, the enrollment rate rose to 90 percent, reaching, by 1985, 97 percent.<sup>138</sup> In addition, a new government policy instituted in the mid-1970s to encourage enrollments in higher education, especially for women, effectively supported the increase in women's enrollment.<sup>139</sup> Between 1970 and 1975, the rate of women's enrollment almost doubled, reaching 26 percent of age-eligible women in universities and 22.9 percent in junior colleges.<sup>140</sup>

Enrollment ratios increased rapidly at the junior college level for women and at the university level for both men and women. Nevertheless, this postwar education reform especially benefited women. The proportion of those who graduated from junior colleges or universities climbed steeply for both sexes, and by 1998, the proportion became greater for women than men.<sup>141</sup> According to *Japan's Education at a Glance 2005*,<sup>142</sup> the entry rate to higher education reached 74.5 percent in 2004, and it was 75.1 percent for women. In addition, as the proportion of women among four-year college graduates increased, more of them chose fields such as the social sciences, natural sciences, or engineering rather than the arts and home economics.<sup>143</sup> Along with rising qualifications, labor shortages, associated wage increases, and the fast growth of the service sector enabled women to enter paid employment. Although some deny the direct influence of education on marriage,<sup>144</sup> higher education for both men and women has a salient influence on the postponement of marriage by strengthening individual autonomy, raising educational qualifications, and increasing the labor force participation of women.<sup>145</sup> In fact, economic gains from education (wage gain per additional year of schooling) have been greater for women than for men. Average monthly wage differences between junior high schoolers and university graduates also have been higher for women than men (43 percent for men and about 60 percent for women). This wage gap indicates that the economic returns to education have been higher for women than men<sup>146</sup> and implies that college diplomas for women became instruments for furthering their careers by raising their wage potential rather than a good passport for mate selection.<sup>147</sup>

As both men and women gained equal educational opportunities, attitudes toward gender roles and expectations also started to change for both men and women. According to Harris and Long,<sup>148</sup> those who agreed with the statement that men should work outside the home and women should remain at home decreased from 36.6 percent to 22.3 percent for women, and from 51.7 percent to 32.9 percent for men, between 1987 and 1995. In addition, not only did women's time become more expensive due to higher educational attainment and longer female participation in the labor market, but also rising economic costs for the education of children became the main burden for women of reproductive age.<sup>149</sup> It created an antinatalist pressure to below-replacement TFRs.

Although a larger share of Japanese women gained more education and employment and married for romantic reasons, after they worked for a couple of years, they found husbands who enabled them to climb up the social ladder, and then withdraw from the formal labor force to become full-time homemakers (*sengyō-shufu*). These women then took care of the domestic needs of their husbands and children and his




Figure 4. Labor Force Participation Rate by Sex

Source: Labor in Statistical Handbook of Japan, Statistics Bureau & Statistical Research and Training Institute, Ministry of International Affairs and Communications, ch. 12, fig. 12.1, <http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/pdf/c12cont.pdf> (accessed November 1, 2006).

parents. Many companies congratulated women for leaving their jobs due to marriage (*kotobuki-taisha*), thereby pressuring single women at work to follow this pattern. This pattern was reflected in the M-shaped curve of female labor force participation in Japan (Figure 4). The left-hand peak of the M indicates women entering the labor force after school, and the right-hand peak of the M indicates their reentry into the labor force after raising a family.<sup>150</sup> Until Japan's Equal Employment Opportunity Law went into effect in 1986, most female workers were assigned to different career tracks than male workers. Gender-segregated job tracks in large firms assumed that women would resign at marriage or childbirth, and excluded women from promotional opportunities and pressured them to quit their jobs on marriage or pregnancy.<sup>151</sup> Based on the 1991 National Survey of Occupational Mobility and Careers of Women, Lee and Hirata found that<sup>152</sup> a husband's college education increased the probability of his wife's job separation. When men brought enough income to the home, companies and families expected women to quit their job after marriage to raise their family. This resulted in uniformity in fertility. Ochiai called this fertility trend "the two-child revolution."<sup>153</sup> Although the majority of women during the Meiji (1868-1912) and early Taisho period (1912-1926) had four or more children, there was no uniformity in the number of children that couples had; but there was increasing uniformity in the number of children that couples had among women born in the early years of the Showa period (1926-1989).

As the economy experienced gradual but long stagnation, however, and the divorce rate mounted, women increasingly realized the fragility of this modern nuclear family. More of them postponed marriage to pursue higher education and jobs to help them to climb up the social ladder, to enjoy their freedom by using their time and money for leisure and hobbies, and to equip themselves to be self-supporting if their marriage failed. Between 1975 and 1995, the mean age at marriage increased from 24.5 to 27.7 years for women, and from 27.6 to 30.7 years for men.<sup>154</sup> The

office of Gender Equality in the Prime Minister's Office enacted the Basic Law for Gender Equality in 1999 to encourage companies, schools, and communities to provide equal opportunity for both men and women to participate in all kinds of social activities and to share responsibilities. The effectiveness of the Basic Law is, however, still questionable because there has been a discrepancy between the law and an unchanging environment due to conservative political elites who attempt to protect traditional family values that pressure women to marry and have children.

By 2003, Japan's TFR dropped to a record low of 1.29 (Figure 3). Sustained fertility decline in Japan is now lower than the replacement level of 2.1, or what demographers call the "the Second Demographic Transition."<sup>155</sup> This indicates that postwar social reform, especially the postwar education and family reform, restructured Japanese society to the point at which marriage has become an individual choice over a traditional responsibility to preserve the *ie*. The decline in arranged marriage, the increase in love marriage, the rapidly increasing divorce rate, and the increasing prevalence of cohabitation and premarital sex<sup>156</sup> reflect the postmodernizing of Japanese society and families that emphasizes individuals over collectives. Marriage and childbearing became less appealing for women, especially for the highly educated, and increasing economic independence contributed to a further postponement of marriage and to permanent celibacy.<sup>157</sup> These changes in patterns of marriage have made it harder for eldest sons to guarantee hands-on helpers to their elderly parents.

At the same time, economic modernization has helped to raise Japan's life expectancy at birth (LEB) to the highest in the world: eighty years for males and 87.5 for females (Figure 5).<sup>158</sup> This achievement arose from an epidemiological transition—a shift from infectious to chronic diseases (such as cancer and cardiovascular disease) as the principle causes of death.<sup>159</sup> The rise in LEB in Japan from the early 1920s to the mid-1960s was largely due to a reduction in the proportion of deaths from infectious diseases (especially gastrointestinal disorders, tuberculosis, pneumonia, and bronchitis) that were particularly fatal to infants and the elderly. A main reason for the decline in fatalities from these diseases was the introduction of antibiotics.<sup>160</sup> As a result of this trend, chronic degenerative diseases began to replace infectious diseases as causes of death. The top three causes of death in Japan are now (in the following order) malignant neoplasm (cancer), cardiovascular (heart) disease, and cerebrovascular disease (stroke).<sup>161</sup>

Such a dramatic demographic transition in Japan, caused by postwar transformation in familial and medical institutions, led Japan to become the most long-lived nation in the world in 2005, having the longest life expectancy at birth, the largest proportion of the population elderly (25 percent), and the smallest proportion fifteen years and younger (13.6 percent).<sup>162</sup> At the same time, more and more women began to express their frustration over being expected to focus most of their energies on caregiving.<sup>163</sup> It brought the question of elder care into the public discourse. Children, especially the eldest son and his family, are persistently expected to repay the priceless obligations (*on*) they received from parents when they were young through providing care in their parents' old age as well as to continue the name of the *ie* throughout generations.

These expectations have burdened women as primary caregivers for their families. The limited supply of child care and elder care services, however, along with tax and benefit rules subsidizing "dependent" housewives (*sengyō-shufu*) through providing them with pensions, tax credits, and other benefits, pushed women outside of the




Figure 5. Life Expectancy at Birth (LEB) for Japanese Men and Women, 1921-2005  
 Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (Tokyo, 2006).

formal labor market and pulled them into the *ie*. These shifts supported the postwar economic expansion and growing capitalism of Japan.<sup>164</sup> Such a system of capitalism supported by patriarchal *ie* has come under pressure as a result of demographic and socioeconomic changes, such as the changing aspirations of women.

## CONCLUSION

To understand the social organization of intergenerational caregiving in Japan, scholars must understand its historical transformation. Prior to the Meiji period, there was regional and class diversity in family life. There was no universal cultural ideal for women to take care of dependent elderly. As Japan moved from the Tokugawa to the Meiji period, the decline in mortality enabled more sons to survive to adulthood to continue the *ie*. It became more feasible for the national government to create legal pressures relegating women to the home to care for children and the dependent elderly in the privatized *ie*. Although the ethics of care moved from the public to the private sphere, and from the contextual to the universal, socioeconomic transformation enabled women to gain equal education and employment and enabled the elderly to live longer. Generational differences in residence, occupation, and education brought various conflicts and tensions in current Japanese society in determining to whom the morality of care should belong.

“Who should take care of the ever-increasing elderly in Japan?” became the major concern in twenty-first-century Japan. Recent studies of aging and the family in Japan involve intensive discussions of care for the frail and dependent elderly, tossing the responsibility and burden between the public and the private spheres. Prior to the Meiji period, care was valued in public, which shifted to the private sphere to modernize, capitalize, and nationalize Japan within a short period. Rapidly decreasing fertility and ever-increasing numbers of elderly in postwar Japan provoked intensive discussions of care, which brought back the issues of care to public awareness. Throughout its history, *care* meant the caregiver’s process and obligation

of looking after someone weak and dependent, and care receivers were perceived as passive recipients. Today, elderly care receivers are coming to be seen as proactively choosing their opportunities to care and to be cared for by important people in their later life course, and the study of social integration in Japan becomes important to understand and promote healthy aging in Japan. It is within this historical and cultural context that Japan now faces the question of how to promote a harmonious integration (*wa*) and mutual dependency needs (*amae*) of its senior and junior generations in later life in the twenty-first century.

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